This paper examines whether market evaluates merger announcements in a reasonable way based on their effect on fundamental value using a sample of 37 mergers from U.S.
I.

INTRODUCTION
Market efficiency hypothesis state that the information that the market uses to determine security prices includes all information available and the market understands the implication of the available information for the security prices (Fama, 1976) . Therefore, prices "fully reflect" available information in efficient markets. Efficient market hypothesis can be tested through several ways where mergers are one of the alternatives.
Mergers have two implications for the tests of market efficiency. First, semistrong form of market efficiency implies that prices will adjust immediately to the announcement of mergers. Financial literature have thoroughly investigated this hypothesis and concluded that market reacts instantaneously to merger announcements. The overwhelming majority of the researches provide evidence that targets of successful mergers earn significantly positive abnormal returns on the announcement of the offers, whereas the returns to acquirers are on average zero (Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Bradley, Desai and Kim, 1983; Desai and Kim, 1988; Nathan and O'Keefe, 1989) .
Second implication of the merger announcements for market efficiency lies in the informational content of merger announcements. If the market is efficient, it is supposed that market's reaction to merger announcements reflects the expected synergetic gains from mergers. That is market should react positively (via higher positive abnormal returns) to mergers that create synergy and react negatively (via lower abnormal returns) to mergers that postmerger destroy shareholders' value.
If the market predicts synergetic gains from mergers properly, then second question should be answered: How the market determines the success of mergers? Since the market do not have an access to the private valuation of bidder and targets in the merger process, they may utilize the characteristics of merger announcements as a signal about the success of merger. Financial literature provide evidence that market uses method of payment, business overlap of merging firms and the degree of valuation of merging firms by market in the determination of direction and magnitude of market's reaction to merger announcements (Asquith, Bruner, and Mullins (1987) , Huang and Walkling (1987) , Rau and Vermaelen (1995) ).
In this study, I test market efficiency hypothesis which assert that market's reaction to the merger announcement is the predictor of the postmerger performance improvements using a sample of 37 mergers between U.S. public industrial firms completed between 1992 and 1997 1 . The postmerger performance measures were regressed by abnormal returns at the announcement period to test market efficiency hypothesis. I also test the strength of market efficiency hypothesis across subsamples defined according to business overlap degree of mergers, method of payment, bidder's price to book ratio compared to industry's median value and combined merger size.
My research findings provide partial support to market efficiency hypothesis. Full sample analysis shows that bidder abnormal stock return at the merger announcement is a good predictor of the postmerger cash flow changes, whereas target abnormal stock returns at the merger announcement are not determined by expectations about postmerger performance improvements. Despite of strong results for full sample, subsample analyses yielded varying results that cast doubt to market efficiency. Apparently, stock markets are able somewhat perfectly to predict postmerger cash flow changes through bidder abnormal returns in the merger announcements in half of the subsets, whereas it mistakes in remaining half. Stock markets react properly to the cash and mixed-financed, high overlap, value, and small merger subsets. In these subsamples, the explained variability in postmerger cash flow changes by abnormal bidder returns in the merger announcements range from 76 to 87 percent, which is extremely strong. However, stock markets are not reacting properly to the merger announcements in the equity-financed, low and medium overlap, growth and big mergers.
The variation of the findings across subsamples suggests that the market sticks to its dynamic clichés in the evaluating merger's future success in the environment of asymmetric information and these clichés sometimes incorporate misleading information content.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes sample and data used in the study. Section III studies postmerger performance improvements. Section IV analyzes market reaction to merger announcements. Section V tests whether market reaction to merger announcements predict properly postmerger performance improvements. Section VI gives a brief conclusion.
1 I end my time period in 1997 year since postmerger performance analysis requires three-year postmerger analysis window.
II. SAMPLE AND DATA
I collected a sample of mergers between 1992 and 1997. The source of the merger data is Mergerstat. The primary database consists of 629 merger bids meeting the belowmentioned restrictions;
1. There is a merger offer to purchase stock in the company.
2. The details of the offer appear in Mergerstat.
3. Transaction date lies between 1992 and 1997.
4. Transactions valued at less than $ 350 million were eliminated. Banks, insurance, and railroad companies were eliminated, since they are subject to different regulations.
5. Country of bidders and targets is USA. Acquisitions by foreign concerns were eliminated.
6. The deals that did not obtain complete ownership of the target were eliminated.
7. The mergers that were later cancelled were eliminated.
From this primary database I select my sample according to the following criteria:
8. The acquiring company is required to have at least, three years premerger and postmerger financial and market data available on the Compustat tapes, whereas the requirement for the target company is three years premerger financial and market data.
9. The size of target should exceed 5% of the size of acquirer. Target firm size is computed from Compustat as the market value of common stock plus the net debt and preferred stock at the beginning of the year before the acquisition.
10. Some companies are involved in more than one merger bid. The merger cases involving these bidder firms are eliminated from the analysis, since there are distorting effects of crossing merger cases. The source of the financial and market data is Compustat.
III. SYNERGETIC GAINS FROM MERGERS
In this section, I do not intend to conduct full postmerger performance analysis. I am more concerned with partial analysis which focuses on whether there are postmerger performance improvements in terms of only cash flows. For this purpose, I construct experimental design and test my hypothesis with nonparametric Wilcoxon signed rank test.
Methodology
In this study, I use EBITD deflated by the market value of equity to measure improvements in operating performance. I define EBITD, measured over the year, as sales, minus cost of goods sold and selling and administrative expenses, plus depreciation and goodwill expenses. This measure excludes the effect of depreciation, goodwill, interest expense and income, and taxes. It is therefore unaffected by the method of accounting for the merger (purchase or pooling accounting) and the method of financing (cash, mixed or equity).
As discussed in Healy, Palepu, and Ruback (1992) , these factors make it difficult to compare traditional accounting returns of the merged firm over time and cross-sectionally.
I exclude the change in equity values of the target and acquiring firms at the merger announcement from the asset base in the postmerger years. For the target and acquirer, the change in equity values is measured on the beginning of the month before the bid offer is announced to the date the target is deleted from Compustat, which is regarded as the delisting date from trading on public exchanges. In an efficient stock market these revaluations To test for the research prediction, I first compute empirical proxies for every company for a seven-year period: three years before through three years after mergers. I then calculate the median of each variable for each firm over pre-and postmerger windows (premerger= years -3 to -1; postmerger = years +1 to +3). Year 0, the year of the merger, is excluded from the analysis since the variable values for this year are not comparable across firms.
Having computed industry-adjusted pre-and postmerger medians, I use the Wilcoxon signed rank test as my principal method of testing for significant changes in the variables. I base my conclusions on the standardized test statistic Z, which for samples of at least 10 follows approximately a standard normal distribution. In addition to the Wilcoxon test, I use a (binomial) proportion test to determine whether the proportion (p) of firms experiencing changes in a given direction is greater than would be expected by chance (typically testing whether p = 0.5). Given the wide variance in firms, and industries, finding that an overwhelming proportion of firms changed performance in the same direction may be at least as informative as a finding concerning the median change in performance.
In addition to analyzing the full sample of merged companies, I perform similar tests for below mentioned subsamples. iii) Value-Growth Subsamples: Theoretical financial literature suggest that companies with high price to book ratios ('growth' firms) are more likely to overestimate their own abilities to manage an acquisition and motivated by hubris (Rau and Vermaelen (1995) ). Therefore, the takeovers by growth firms destroy shareholder value. On the other hand, companies with low price to book ratios ('value' firms) are more prudent before approving acquisitions.
Since these acquisitions are not motivated by hubris, they should create shareholder value. I rank the mergers into separate subsamples based on bidders' price to book ratio relative to their industries' price to book ratio at the beginning of the year of merger announcement. Bidder companies' price to book ratio is compared to the industry's median price to book ratio in the beginning of the year prior to announcement. If bidder companies' price to book ratio is higher than industry's median price to book ratio book, the merger case is classified as 'growth' merger, otherwise as "value" merger. As a result of this ranking, 17 (30%) mergers appeared to be 'value' mergers and 39 (70%) bidders as 'growth' mergers. The empirical results of this section is directly comparable and in the same line with that of Healy, Palepu and Ruback (1992) . They examine the post-acquisition operating performance of merged firms using a sample of the 50 largest mergers between U.S. public industrial firms completed in the period 1979 to mid-1984 and find that there are significant improvements in operating cash flow returns after the merger. *, **, *** indicates significance at 10, 5, and 1% significance levels respectively using one-tailed test.
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IV. MARKET REACTION TO MERGER ANNOUNCEMENTS
In this section, I examine the market reaction to the merger announcements which may provide an insight about the market's expectations of merger's success.
Methodology
The information content of a merger event is measured as the abnormal common stock return relative to the aggregate market return. An estimate of the abnormal return of for security j on event day t (t=0 is designated the event date) is defined as the market-model prediction error (PE):
where, R j t = market return of the securities over month t which is measured by summing close price at the end of the month t plus dividends per share within the month t, divided by the close price of the month (t-1).
E(R j t ) = expected rate of return on security i for day t that is estimated using Capital
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). CAPM is used to determine the expected rate of return for an asset at a given level of risk. Essentially, expected rate of return for security j is calculated as:
where R r f = risk free rate (measured by 3 month USA Treasury bill rate) To determine the market reaction for acquirers and targets to the merger announcements, I calculate monthly cumulative abnormal returns for announcement month of the merger.
Since Compustat retains 5-year market data, in order to test for market efficiency, I had to select mergers announced later than June 1995 which resulted in the sample size of 37 mergers. Table 3 reports the abnormal returns in the merger process over one-month event window. Consistent with previous researches, target firms experience large abnormal returns.
Empirical Results and Discussion
The average (median) abnormal return for the targets is 19 percentage points (19 percent).
The t-statistics is significant at 1 percent significance level. I also found that bidder firms experience positive, but not statistically significant abnormal returns. Combined abnormal return, which is calculated by weighting the target and bidder returns by their relative sizes in the beginning of the year of announcement, is significantly positive. The average (median) abnormal combined return is 7 percentage points (5 percent) and 70 percent of all mergers experience positive combined abnormal returns. The t-statistics is significant at 5 percent significance level. Subsample analyses show that target shareholders abnormal returns and combined returns are significantly positive abnormal returns across all subsamples 3 , whereas bidder shareholders' abnormal returns are not statistically different from zero. These results suggest that financial markets react favorably to mergers and mergers create value. The value is created, not transferred, since significant abnormal returns to targets do not come at the expense of bidder shareholders.
The research findings in this section are in the same line with the previous researches which provide empirical evidence that shareholders of target firms realize large positive abnormal returns in completed mergers. The evidence on the rewards to bidding firms is mixed, but the weight of the evidence suggests that zero returns earned by successful bidding firms in mergers. Since targets gain and bidders do not appear to lose, the evidence suggests that mergers create value (Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Nathan and O'Keefe, 1989; Desai and Kim, 1988; Bradley, Desai and Kim, 1983) .
TABLE 3 Summary of Results from Tests of Abnormal Returns for the Full and Subsamples of Mergers
This table presents empirical results for my full sample of mergers. For each empirical proxy I give the number of usable observation, the mean and median values, and standard deviation of the proxy for the three-year periods prior and subsequent to merger, and a test of significance of abnormal returns. The final two columns detail the percentage of firms whose abnormal returns are positive, as well as a test of significance of this ratio. Significance levels for subsets with total number of cases less than 10 are not reported. *, **, *** indicates significance at 10, 5, and 1% significance levels respectively using two-tailed test.
Variables
V. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ABNORMAL RETURNS AT MERGER ANNOUNCEMENTS AND POSTMERGER CASH FLOW CHANGES
If stock markets are efficient, it is logical to expect positive correlation between bidder abnormal returns in the announcement period and postmerger performance improvements.
Markets should react positively to bidders' shares, if they expect cash flow improvements, otherwise not.
Methodology
I use simple regression analysis to test relationship between abnormal stock returns at the merger announcement and postmerger cash flow improvements. Since I test whether abnormal stock returns at the merger announcement predict correctly postmerger cash flows, ROE is dependent, and abnormal return is an independent variable.
Empirical Results and Discussion
Regression analysis results are reported in Table 4 a Cash flow returns are median industry-adjusted return on equity which is the earnings before tax, interest expenses, and depreciations divided by the market value of equity in the beginning of the year. b Short-Term Abnormal Returns are the abnormal common stock return in excess of the expected rate of return of security. c Significantly different from zero at the 1% level, using a two-tailed test. d Significantly different from zero at the 10% level, using a two-tailed test.
Abnormal bidder stock returns at the merger announcement fails to predict postmerger cash flow changes in remaining subsamples. The regression model and slope coefficients are not significant for low and medium overlap, equity-financed, growth and larger merger subsamples. In these subsamples, the coefficient of determination ranges from 0% to 12%.
VI. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
Financial markets are assumed to be efficient in that asset prices reflect all information about individual firms. If the market evaluates managerial decisions in a reasonable way based on their effect on fundamental value, significant positive correlation is assumed between abnormal returns in the announcement period and postmerger performance improvements.
My findings provide partial support for the market efficiency hypothesis. The bidder abnormal return at the announcement period is a good predictor of the postmerger cash flow improvements. Target's abnormal returns at the announcement period are apparently determined by other factors rather than market's expectations about the success of mergers.
Though, the market efficiency hypothesis is supported by full sample analysis, the subsample analysis of market efficiency hypothesis cast strong doubts to market efficiency.
Apparently, bidder abnormal return is an excellent predictor of postmerger performance improvements in high overlap, cash and mixed financed, value and smaller mergers, whereas it fails to predict postmerger performance improvements in low and medium overlap, equity financed, growth and larger mergers. The failure of abnormal returns in the announcement period to predict postmerger performance improvements in the half of the subsamples suggest that markets do not react properly to the information content of bid process and it may hint to the serious market imperfections.
The violation of the market efficiency hypothesis in the half of the subsamples can be explained within asymmetric information framework. Since the market do not have an access to the private valuation of bidder and targets in the merger process, they utilize dynamic clichés such as method of payment, business overlap of merging firms and value-growth category of bidding firms as a signal about the success of merger. However, these dynamic clichés may incorporate misleading information content which may lead the market to the improper reactions as we found in our analysis.
